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In this paper, we examine whether the trading of the equities of the U.S. international lenders was 
informationally efficient when the IMF announced its term loan agreement concerning South Korea 
in late 1997. More specifically, we test whether the foreign exposure levels of different lenders can 
be distinguished and used by investors to rapidly price the lenders’ stocks proportionally according 
to the foreign exposure levels. A cross-sectional CAR regression model is used. The evidence 
indicates that the market is informationally efficient in trading the lenders’ equities during the IMF 
assistance of South Korea as investors incorporated the foreign exposure into pricing their bank 
equities rapidly and proportionally. There is a significant positive relationship between the banks' 
equity prices and their respective exposure levels on the event days. This relationship is not shown 





his paper examines the market informational efficiency hypothesis in the Asian currency crisis. 
Informational efficiency is tested as to how fast the news of the term loan announcements is 
incorporated into the equity pricing of U.S. banks that are lending in the international debt markets. We 
study how the IMF term loan announcements concerning South Korea in late November and early December 1997 
affect informed trading of the equities of the U.S. international lenders to South Korea. 
 
 Similar hypotheses in international currency crisis are tested in Billingsley, et al. (1988), Cornell and 
Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Brunner and Simms (1987), Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a), Han and 
Wild (1990), Unal, et al. (1993), and Madura, et al. (1993), Demirguc-kunt and Huizinga (1993), Sinkey and Carter 
(1999), Zhang (2001), etc. Cornell and Shapiro (1986) find that without disclosure investors were able to distinguish 
between banks with extensive foreign loans and those with lesser or no foreign exposure during the 1982 Mexican 
foreign debt moratorium. Their findings support the “dribs and drabs” hypothesis, which holds that negative news was 
slowly absorbed by the market during the event window. Bruner and Simms (1987) find that over the first few days 
following the 1982 Mexican debt moratorium event, bank lenders were penalized inconsistently with their degree of 
exposure indicating contagion pricing. However, the market learned very quickly and the pricing of the bank stocks 
corrected after the initial five days indicating rational pricing thereafter. Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) also find, for 
the August 1982 Mexican debt moratorium, that the stock price response is proportional to exposure and that investors 
were able to distinguish among the exposure levels of different banks.  
 
Madura, Tucker and Zarruk (1992) study the reaction of bank stock prices to the Third-world Debt Reduction 
Plan (DRP) of 1989, which was proposed by the World Bank to international bank creditors, allowing them to swap 
existing bank debt for more secure debt or equity of Less-Developed Countries (LDCs). They find the degree of 
change in equity values was positively associated with the bank’s degree of exposure to the debt of less developed 
countries. For exposed banks, the rational pricing hypothesis is supported - market investors seem to be able to 
distinguish the lending exposure levels correctly. Unal, Demirguc-kunt and Leung (1993) study the stock market’s 
reaction to the announcement of the Brady plan and the Mexican debt-reduction agreement in 1989. For U.S. banks, 
the Brady announcement caused multinational banks to have significant positive returns. The gain was not uniform 
T 
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across banks and it had no significant impact on non-multinational banks. They also find that the price response is not 
linearly proportional to exposure. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of IMF term loans to South Korea on the equity values of U.S. bank 
lenders during late November and early December 1997. Theoretically, banks that had high exposures to South Korea 
would have been more heavily and negatively impacted than banks that had low exposures if the IMF had not lent to 
South Korea. As such, the equity values of the former would have been more negatively affected than those of the 
latter. Because of the IMF term loans, the results are expected to be opposite, namely, the banks that were more 
heavily exposed to South Korea are expected to have more positive return impacts than the banks that had less 
exposure to South Korea. Are investors informed of the financial fundamentals of those international lenders quickly 
enough? If yes, presumably, the cumulative returns should not be significant, while only the event day abnormal 
returns should be significant. If otherwise, then the new information is probably much slowly absorbed by the market 
(“dribs and drabs” hypothesis in previous literature), additional requirements for banks to publish more detailed 
balance sheet data may be needed. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides the background of the IMF term loans to South Korea 
around late November and early December 1997. Section III presents the data and methodology. Section IV presents 




The event window in this study is from November 13, 1997, the date Mr. Camdessus (the IMF head then) 
was asked by South Korean officials to come over, to December 31, 1997, the ending date of the two-year sample 
period.  
 
Two critical individual announcements are chosen for the IMF term loan to South Korea: December 1, 1997 
(Monday) is the day zero in this study. It is the first trading day after South Korea announced unilaterally that a 
bailout agreement had been reached between its government and the IMF. This event announcement is hypothesized 
to contain significant positive new information international lenders, especially those to South Korea. 
 
The second event is December 4, 1997 (Thursday, day three in this study) when the news of the final official 
bailout agreement fully reached the markets. This event announcement is also hypothesized to contain significantly 
positive new information to international lenders for resolving any remaining uncertainties about the bailout. The 
remaining uncertainties as to when the final agreement would be reached were aggravated especially after the South 
Korean government backed off an earlier announcement (day zero) saying that a final deal was not done.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The sample is composed of all twenty-seven U.S. banks that had foreign loan exposure at the end of 1997. 
The twenty-seven foreign exposed banks with their respective foreign exposure are shown in Table 1. The potential 
overlapping “other events” in the event window screened from the Wall Street Journal and the Lexis®-Nexis® 
Academic Universe database include mergers and acquisitions (M&As), legislative changes and earnings information. 
However, only events related to M&As are considered to be relevant.
1
 Because of the lack of general market and 
banking industry events, the sampled banks involved in M&As are not excluded from the final sample and the 







                                                 
1 These are recorded on a daily basis from 11/25/97 to 12/31/97, available upon request. 
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Table 1: All Foreign Exposed U.S. Banks (as of end of 1997) 
 
All numbers except those in column (3) are in million dollars as of the end of 1997. “n.a.” indicates the bank’s South 
Korean foreign exposure is below 1% or 0.75% of total assets. According to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) regulation, when the foreign exposure level in a country, it is less than 1% is not 
required to be reported. 
 
Bank Ticker Exposure Value Ratio 
  (1) (2) =(1)/(2) 
Citicorp CCI 42500 19293 2.2029 
Chase Manhattan Corp CMB 42744 20002 2.1370 
Bankers Trust Corp BT 9955 5050 1.9713 
Morgan (J P) & Co JPM 18176 10710 1.6971 
Bank Of New York Co Inc BK 7776 4947 1.5719 
BankAmerica Corp BAC 28532 19223 1.4843 
First Chicago NBD Corp FCN/NBD 4515 7770 0.5811 
BankBoston Corp BKB 12568 4332 2.9012 
Pacific Century Financial BOH 1609 1117 1.4399 
Republic New York Corp RNB 4176 2938 1.4213 
Riggs National Corporation RIGS 390 459 0.8485 
Comerica Inc CMA 2085 2512 0.8301 
State Street Corp STT 1569 1995 0.7865 
CoreStates Financial Corp CFL 2454 3237 0.7581 
UnionBancal Corp UNBC 1399 2532 0.5527 
First Hawaiian Inc FHWN 339 732 0.4634 
Mellon Bank Corp MEL 1566 3652 0.4288 
Northern Trust Corp NTRS 470 1619 0.2904 
NationsBank Corp NB 4697 21274 0.2208 
MBNA Corp KRB 599 1970 0.2174 
Norwest Corp NOB 1076 6834 0.1575 
Wachovia Corp WB 639 5174 0.1236 
Union Planters Corp UPC 207 1692 0.1225 
First Union Corp (N C) FTU 1431 12032 0.1189 
SunTrust Banks Inc STI 247 5199 0.0476 
Sterling Bancorp STL 0.79 90 0.0088 
Wells Fargo & Co WFC 79 12614 0.0063 
 
 
Balance sheet data are from COMPUSTAT, the National Information Center, Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, 
Inc., bank annual reports, and 10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Daily stock 
returns and value weighted market indexes are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database from January 2, 1996 to December 31, 1997.  
 
In this study, the foreign lending exposure variable is defined as the foreign loans divided by the bank’s book 
value of equity. Book value of equity, rather than market value of equity or total assets, is used because it is most 
related to the default risk that is the concern of the regulators.  
Models and Hypothesis 
 
The abnormal return for each bank in the sample is obtained based on the following two-index market model:  
 
Rit = i + iRm,t + iIt + it                      (1) 
 
where Rmt represents a typical market index (value-weighted CRSP index in this study), It is an index representing 
unexpected interest rate changes (AR(1) of a 30-year T-bond rate series in this study). The estimation window for the 
market model is from January 2, 1996 to June 30, 1997 (379 observations). The trading period from July 1, 1997 to 
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the start of the event window is excluded to eliminate the impact on equity pricing by potential structural changes 




The market informational efficiency hypothesis is tested using the following cross-sectional regression:  
 
CARi (t1, t2) = 1 + 2 (EXi) + 3 (EXi)
2
 + i                    (2) 
  
where CARi(t1, t2)  is the cumulative abnormal return for bank i from t1 (also the event day zero in this study) to t2 
(day one, two or three in the tests.) EXi represents the exposure of bank i. Its coefficients represent both a linear and a 
quadratic relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and the exposure levels across banks. Under the 
FDICIA’s Prompt Correction Action (PCA) provisions, even the largest banks will be disciplined by the regulators 
promptly if their capital positions deteriorate and fall below the requirements. Regulatory forbearance thus is reduced 
extensively as opposed to circumstances before the Act was passed. Since a potential significant capital loss will cause 
the credit risk of the TBTF banks to increase dramatically, thus increasing the regulatory sanctions on them, using a 
quadratic function to describe the relationship between the abnormal returns and the relative exposure levels for the 
banks may very well be justified. 
 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency says that market is informationally efficient when security prices 
correctly reflect all publicly available information at once (Fama, 1991). In this study, we test market informational 
efficiency as to whether market investors react to the IMF announcements regarding South Korea in late 1997 fast 
enough to incorporate those international lenders’ fundamental financial information into the stock prices.3 We 
hypothesize the most important financial information be the foreign exposure variable, considering the link between 
the IMF term loan announcements and the impacts on the international lenders’ equities is through the lenders’ foreign 
exposure (loans and investment) in those countries in crisis. As such, the new information would be composed mainly 
the timing and the interpretation of the announcements and the accuracy of any reports on the financial statements of 
the lenders, especially their foreign exposure variable.  
 
If not only a single individual announcement is significant but the cumulative announcements are significant 
as well, then it implies that investors needed more time to react to news announcements (“dribs and drabs” hypothesis) 
and that not all the information was available to everyone in the market at the time when the announcements were 
made. This is especially true when single individual abnormal returns on event dates are not significant but cumulative 
abnormal returns are. However, if the model is significant only on the individual event days, but not over nonevent 
dates, then it implies that the market absorbs and reflects the new information fully and rapidly and the market is 
informationally efficient. That is, we investigate the rapidity of the market’s response and the duration of investors’ 
response to the IMF term loan announcements to South Korea during late 1997. The interpretation from testing this 
hypothesis will draw upon the comparisons between the impact of individual announcements and cumulative 
announcements revealed using Model (2). If the market is not informationally efficient, then additional requirements 




If the international debt markets are informationally efficient, then the news of IMF term loan 
announcements should be incorporated into the equity prices immediately, and the abnormal returns of the foreign 
exposed banks should be significant on the event dates but insignificant on the nonevent dates. Since the IMF term 
loan announcements happen in the international debt markets, equity returns of banks with foreign exposures are 
directly affected and the effect should be proportional to the changes in the foreign exposure variable. Thus, the 
existence of market informational efficiency can be examined by observing whether the coefficient estimates of the 
foreign exposure variable are significant in terms of equity pricing on both the event dates and nonevent dates. Market 
                                                 
2 However, we did run the test without omitting the date period from the estimation window, the results are similar even though slightly less 
significant as the return variance during the crisis is understandably higher. 
3 As the test of market efficiency is always a joint test, we assume the simple models used in this study are correctly specified and expected returns 
are correctly estimated. 
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informational efficiency through the cross-sectional relationship between banks’ equity return responses and their 
respective exposure levels is examined by Model (2). 
 
 If market efficiency is rejected here, meaning the significance of the models was present on nonevent dates 
or the models are not significant on event dates, this could be because the market is indeed not efficient or an incorrect 
model is used. If it is assumed that Model (2) is correctly specified and the parameter estimate of the exposure 
variable is significantly different from zero on event dates and not significant on nonevent dates, then the evidence of 
market informational efficiency exists related to the announcements of IMF term loans to South Korea in early 
December 1997. Presumably, the higher the foreign exposure a bank had, the higher a positive return the bank should 
yield, since the IMF loan commitment was assumed to be a positive event in international debt markets. 
 
Since only twenty-seven banks (number of observations in this cross-sectional analysis) have foreign lending 
exposure, the test is thus sensitive to the underlying normality assumption, constant variance assumption and the 
existence of the outliers of the model. The relevant diagnosis tests (normality tests calculating the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the actual residuals and predicted residuals and the examination of outliers from the residual 
plots) are conducted on the sample and the normality test results are reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Normality Tests for the Cross-sectional Regression Model 
 
The CAR model CARi (t1, t2) = 1 + 2 (EXi) + 3 (EXi)
2 + i is tested for all 27 foreign exposed 
banks. Each CAR interval below produces an estimated regression model. Car(0) = AR(0). The 
last regression model uses CAR = CAR(0) + AR(3). The critical value for n = 27 at the 5% 
significance level is about 0.961. The estimated correlation coefficient r is the Pearson 
correlation estimates between the ordered residuals and the expected residuals W-p is the p-value 
of Shapiro-Wilk W-statistic. 
 
 Full Model Without (EXi)
2 
CAR Interval r W-p r W-p 
0 0.9838 0.8265 0.9773 0.6299 
(0, +1) 0.9743 0.0882 0.9718 0.0590 
(0, +2) 0.9778 0.3753 0.9791 0.4530 
(0, +3) 0.9883 0.7895 0.9873 0.6783 
(0), (+3) 0.9813 0.2340 0.9665 0.0494 
 
 
The estimated correlation coefficients of the actual residuals and the expected residuals on the five CAR 
regressions in Table 2 are all significant at the 5 percent level. We fail to reject normality in every case. Neither any 
serious outliers nor the violation of the constant variance assumption is found in the models from the examination of 
the models’ residual plots. 
 
Tables 3 to 5 present the results from the cross-sectional CAR regression Model (2). The five CAR 
regressions are run with each conducted on a single day from day zero to day three. The fifth one uses the ARs just for 
day zero and day three. In Table 3, on December 1, the model’s F-value is 4.695 with a p-value of 0.0190. R-square is 
28.12%. While the model is significant, neither the linear coefficient estimate nor the quadratic coefficient estimate is 
significant. The p-values for the linear and quadratic coefficient estimates are 0.6124 and 0.7645, respectively. The 
variance inflation factor between the two independent variables is 14.33, which indicates strong presence of 
multicollinearity. As such, models are run with either the linear exposure or quadratic exposure variable alone, the 
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Table 3: The Estimated Cross-sectional Regression Models (Full Models) 
 
The CAR model CARi (t1, t2) = 1 + 2 (EXi) + 3 (EXi)
2 + i is tested for all 27 foreign exposed banks. 
The estimated correlation coefficient r is the Pearson correlation estimates between the ordered residuals 
and the expected residuals. P-values are in parentheses. Each CAR interval below produces an estimated 
regression model. Car(0) = AR(0). The last regression model uses CAR = CAR(0) + AR(3). The null 
hypothesis is: 2 = 3 = 0, the alternative hypothesis is: Not both betas are zero. P-values are in the 
parentheses. VIF is 14.33 in each test above, indicating the existence of the multicollinearity. 
 
Event Date F-value β1 β2 β3 R-square 
0 
4.695** 0.0111 0.0074 0.0019 
28.12% 
(0.0190) (0.0489) (0.6124) (0.7645) 
(0, +1) 
1.472 0.0172 0.0047 0.0007 
10.93% 
(0.2495) (0.0025) (0.7357) (0.9095) 
(0, +2) 
0.668 0.0181 0.0130 -0.0029 
5.27% 
(0.5221) (0.0412) (0.5700) (0.7737) 
(0, +3) 
1.217 0.0354 -0.0191 0.0139 
9.21% 
(0.3237) (0.0081) (0.5680) (0.3560) 
(0), (+3) 
4.220** 0.0284 -0.0247 0.0187 
26.02% 
(0.0269) (0.0056) (0.3354) (0.1078) 
**: indicates the significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 4: The Estimated Cross-sectional Regression Models (With Quadratic Term Only) 
 
The CAR model CARi (t1, t2) = 1 + 3 (EXi)
2 + i is tested for all 27 foreign exposed banks. The estimated correlation 
coefficient r is the Pearson correlation estimates between the ordered residuals and the expected residuals. P-values are in 
parentheses. Each CAR interval below produces an estimated regression model. Car(0) = AR(0). The last regression 
model uses CAR = CAR(0) + AR(3). The null hypothesis is: 3 = 0, the alternative hypothesis is: Not both betas are zero. 
P-values are in the parentheses. 
 
Event Date F-value β1 β3 R-square 
0 
9.404*** .0132 .0051*** 
27.33% 
(0.0051) 0.0006) 0.0051) 
(0, +1) 
2.931* .0186 0.0027* 
10.49% 
(0.0993) .0001) 0.0993) 
(0, +2) 
1.032 .0218 .0027 
96% 
(0.3195) 0.0003) (0.3195) 
(0, +3) 
2.157 .0299 0.0056 
7.94% 
(0.1544) 0.0007) (0.1544) 
(0), (+3) 
7.483** .0213 .0081** 
3.04% 
(0.0113) (0.0014) 0.0113) 
***, **, *: indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 4, when the linear exposure term is excluded from the model, on day zero, the F-value increases to 
9.404 with a p-value of 0.0051. In Table 5, when the quadratic exposure term is excluded from the model, on the same 
day, the F-value increases to 9.649 with a p-value of 0.0047. Other results are also very similar. Either the linear or 
quadratic exposure term alone is good enough to explain the return behavior, only the results from the model without 
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Table 5: The Estimated Cross-sectional Regression Models (With Linear Term Only) 
 
The CAR model CARi (t1, t2) = 1 + 2 (EXi) + i is tested for all 27 foreign exposed banks. The 
estimated correlation coefficient r is the Pearson correlation estimates between the ordered 
residuals and the expected residuals. P-values are in parentheses. Each CAR interval below 
produces an estimated regression model. Car(0) = AR(0). The last regression model uses CAR = 
CAR(0) + AR(3). The null hypothesis is: 2 = 0, the alternative hypothesis is: Not both betas are 
zero. P-values are in the parentheses. 
 
Event Date F-value β1 β2 R-square 
0 
9.649*** 0.0101 .0016*** 
27.85% 
(0.0047) (0.0089) (0.0047) 
(0, +1) 
3.051* 0.0168 0.0062* 
10.88% 
(0.0930) (0002) (0.0930) 
(0, +2) 
1.299 0.0197 0.0067 
4.94% 
(0.2653) (0.0043) (0.2653) 
(0, +3) 
1.556 .0279 0.0109 
5.86% 
(0.2238) (0.0061) (0.2238) 
(0), (+3) 
5.271** 0.0183 0.0158** 
17.41% 
(0.0303) 0.0201) (0.0303) 
***, **, *: indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 5, the five CAR regressions are run with each conducted on a single day from day 0 to day 3. The 
fifth regression uses the ARs for day 0 and day 3. Because the abnormal returns on day 2 are not significant, not 
surprisingly, the two-day cumulative return regression yields an F-value of 3.051 with a p-value of 0.0930. The R-
square decreases to 10.88 percent from 27.85 percent on day zero. The three-day cumulative regression yields an F-
value of 1.299 with a p-value of 0.2653. The R-square is only 4.94 percent. The cumulative regression on December 
4, including the impacts from both events simultaneously, is not significant at 5 percent. This is not surprising because 
the abnormal returns on both day 2 and day 3 are not significant. The F-value is 1.556 and its p-value is 0.2238. The 
cumulative regression is also run using the two event days’ abnormal returns while leaving the abnormal returns on 
day +1 and day +2 out. The F-value is 5.271 with a p-value of 0.0303. 
 
 In sum, the CAR models on day zero and the cumulative regression of ARs just on day zero and day three are 
significant, indicating that there is a strong positive relationship between the banks’ equity returns and their respective 
foreign lending exposure levels. The changes of equity returns were proportional to the foreign exposure levels. It is 
worth noting that the CAR models are not significant from day one to day three. Based on the evidence above, the 
IMF term loan announcement news was incorporated into the equity pricing fairly quickly and the markets seemed to 
be informationally efficient. While it is not clear which exposure variable, linear or quadratic, is more important, the 
exposure variable appears to be important on the event dates and is not considered as important on the nonevent dates 




 This paper examines the market informational efficiency hypothesis in the international currency crisis. By 
examining the link between the IMF term loan announcements and the impacts on the international lenders’ equities 
through the lenders’ foreign exposure (loans and investment) in those countries in crisis, we investigate the rapidity of 
the market’s response and the duration of investors’ response to the IMF term loan announcements to South Korea in 
late 1997. 
 
We find that for the foreign exposed banks, the foreign exposure tends to be significant on event dates but 
insignificant on nonevent dates. The evidence indicates that the market is informationally efficient during the IMF 
bailout of South Korea in late 1997 as investors incorporated the foreign exposure into pricing their bank equities 
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rapidly and proportionally. There is a significant positive relationship between the banks' equity prices and their 




1. Billingsley, R., Lamy, S., and Robert, E., 1988, The regulation of international lending -- IMF support, the 
debt crisis, and bank stockholder wealth, Journal of Banking and Finance 12, 255-274. 
2. Bruner, R. F. and Simms, J. M., 1987, The international debt crisis and bank security returns in 1982, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 19(1), 46-55. 
3. Cornell, Bradford, and Shapiro, Alan C., 1986, The reaction of bank stock prices to the international debt 
crisis, Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 55-73. 
4. Demirguc Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H., 1993, Official credits to developing countries: implicit transfers to the 
banks, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25, Part 1. 
5. Fama, Eugene F., 1991. Efficient capital markets II, Journal of Finance 46, 1575-1617. 
6. Han, J. and Wild, J., 1990, Unexpected earnings and intra-industry information transfers: Further evidence, 
Journal of Accounting Research 28(1), 211-219. 
7. Madura, J., Tucker, A.L., and Zarruk, E., 1993, Market reaction to the thrift bailout, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 17(4), 591-608.   
8. Musumeci, J. J. and Sinkey, J. F., Jr. 1990, The international debt crisis, investor contagion, and bank 
security returns in 1987: The Brazilian experience, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 22, 209-220. 
9. Sinkey, J. F. and Greenwalt, M., 1991, Loan-loss experience and risk-taking behavior at large commercial 
banks, Journal of Financial Services Research 5, 43-59. 
10. Sinkey, J. F. and Carter, D. A., 1999, The reaction of bank stock prices to news of derivatives losses by 
corporate clients, Journal of Banking and Finance 23, 1725-1743. 
11. Smirlock, M. and Kaufold H., 1987, Bank foreign lending, mandatory disclosure rules, and the reaction of 
bank stock prices to the Mexican debt crisis, Journal of Business 60(3), 347-364. 
12. Unal, H., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Leung, K.W., 1993, The Brady plan, 1989 Mexican debt-reduction 
agreement, and bank stock returns in United States and Japan, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
25(3(Part 1)), 410-429. 
13. Zhang, Z., 1993, The Impact of IMF Term Loans on U.S. Bank Creditors' Equity Values: An Event Study of 
South Korea's Case, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 11, 2001, 363-
394. 
